On the robustness of minimum wage effects : geographically-disparate trends and job growth equations. by Addison,  J. T. et al.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
19 November 2015
Version of attached ﬁle:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached ﬁle:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Addison, J. T. and Blackburn, M. L. and Cotti, C. D. (2015) 'On the robustness of minimum wage eﬀects :
geographically-disparate trends and job growth equations.', IZA journal of labor economics., 4 . p. 24.
Further information on publisher's website:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s40172-015-0039-z
Publisher's copyright statement:
c© 2015 Addison et al. Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a
link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Additional information:
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-proﬁt purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
 On the Robustness of Minimum Wage Effects: 
Geographically-Disparate Trends and Job Growth 
Equations* 
 
 
John T. Addison,* McKinley L. Blackburn,** and Chad D. Cotti*** 
 
 
*University of Durham and University South Carolina 
**University of South Carolina 
***University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh  
 
 
Abstract 
Recent attempts to incorporate spatial heterogeneity in minimum-wage employment models have 
been attacked for using overly simplistic trend controls and for neglecting the potential impact of 
wage minima on employment growth. This paper investigates whether such considerations call 
into question findings of statistically insignificant employment effects reported in the literature 
for an archetypal low-wage sector in the United States: restaurants and bars. It is concluded that 
a focus on employment levels is still appropriate for this sector, and further that the deployment 
of nonlinear trend controls does not dislodge prior fairly minimal support for the existence of 
adverse minimum-wage employment effects on employment. 
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I.  Introduction 
In a critique of recent contributions to the literature on minimum wages, Neumark, Salas, and Wascher 
(2014) have questioned the usefulness of common approaches to controlling for spatial heterogeneity in 
employment equations. In so far as these criticisms apply in large part to results reported for the restaurant 
and bars sector by Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti [hereafter ABC] (2012), the present paper establishes 
the extent to which their findings survive the alternative treatments proposed by Neumark, Salas, and 
Wascher.  In the process, and as a secondary exercise, we also address an alternative critique having a 
basis in the notion that minimum wage effects are more easily detected in employment growth than in 
employment levels, such that conventional controls for spatial heterogeneity may attenuate estimates of 
how the minimum wage affects the level of employment (Meer and West, 2013, 2015). The wider 
backdrop to the present analysis is a recent meta-analysis by Wolfson and Belman (2014) of 27 modern 
minimum-wage studies, which controlled for study differences and concluded that minimum wages have 
no economically or statistically meaningful disemployment effects.
1
 
 
Using a large sample of county-level employment data, ABC estimated the effect of minimum 
wages on employment in the restaurant-and-bar sector, 1990-2005. In addition to time and county fixed 
effects, the authors’ model included a county-specific effect allowed to follow a linear trend over time 
(along with county-level controls) in a framework that permitted the investigators to assess the 
consistency of the estimates with a competitive-model explanation of employment and earnings 
determination.  
In general, ABC concluded that minimum wages did not reduce employment in a sector that 
contains the highest percentage of workers at or below the relevant minimum wage in the United States 
and in which a little over 40 percent of workers worked for the minimum wage plus two dollars or less. 
                                                          
1 See also an earlier meta-analysis by Doucouliagos and Stanley (2009) that suggests, after having taken 
publication bias into account, a not dissimilar conclusion in arriving at a minimum-wage elasticity of -
0.01. 
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The authors argued that their estimates could be considered largely consistent with a competitive model in 
which the elasticity of demand for labor was very small. In the present paper, we seek to evaluate the 
robustness of the results presented in ABC allowing for more flexible time trends, updating the sample 
period, and modeling employment changes as well as employment levels. The goal of the exercise is 
fundamentally to determine what can be learned from recent criticism, much of which is to be viewed as 
constructive and productive of research progress.  
II. Two Basic Approaches, Then and Now 
A General Statement 
As is well known, research on minimum wages has gone through several stages. But we will begin with 
the new minimum wage research of the early 1990s. This earlier phase of modern research focused on 
state data because of the advantages of using simultaneous panels rather than an aggregate time series. 
One branch exploited geographical variation in the setting of minimum wages in an industry case study 
approach, while the other used a standard state-panel analysis in which state effects were held constant.  
Both approaches sought valid counterfactual control groups for what would have transpired 
absent increases in the minimum wage, and each reported generally divergent findings. (For a detailed 
review of this literature, see Neumark and Wascher, 2007, 2008.) The case studies pointed to a lack of job 
loss – even gains – and the two-way state-panel approach suggested the opposite for long panels of data 
(with minimum wage elasticities in the range -0.1 to -0.3). Case studies of a particular change in the 
minimum wage in a particular industry typically used only a short time horizon (raising obvious concerns 
about missing lags in disemployment effects), and in covering individual cases raised problems of 
inference and external validity.  For their part, the state-panel studies did not allow for heterogeneous 
trends in states that increased minimum wages; for example, states experiencing greater increases in 
minimum wages might have systematically different labor market characteristics unrelated to their 
minimum wage policies.  Also, the state-panel studies largely failed to recognize the potential importance 
of within-state error correlation in constructing standard errors.  
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Enter the new new minimum wage research. This has taken two forms. One form has continued to 
use national panels that now incorporate geographic-specific trend variables as a means of controlling for 
heterogeneity in the underlying long-term growth prospects of low-wage employment (as well as other 
trends in teen employment). An example is the use of state or, as is the case for ABC, county linear 
trends, Another variant allows time effects to vary by Census division. Thus, the inclusion of division-
specific time effects controls for spatial heterogeneity in differential employment patterns such as region-
specific shocks (see Allegretto, Dube, and Reich, 2011). Such division-specific controls either substitute 
for or supplement geographic-specific linear trends.   
The second innovation has been to extend the case study approach using larger panels. For 
example, this approach has used a research design based on cross-border pairs in a specification that 
(initially) included county-pair/period interactions so as to control for shocks common to both counties. 
Thus, the effect of minimum wages was identified from differences in employment and minimum wages 
across paired counties on either side of a state border (see Dube, Lester, and Reich, 2010). 
These two approaches were (mostly) to yield results at odds with the standard state panel 
exercises, providing little or no evidence of job loss in sectors or for groups most likely to be impacted by 
minimum wage increases. Thus, Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011), using Current Population Survey 
(CPS) data on teens between 1990 and 2009, obtained minimum wage effects consistent with the standard 
state panel model before sweeping out the variation across Census divisions and allowing for state-
specific trends, only to report essentially zero employment (and indeed hours) elasticities after their 
inclusion.
2
 Other interesting results from their study were (a) an absence of anticipation effects with the 
inclusion of the two spatial controls, and (b) a seeming lack of differing employment effects over the 
business cycle.  
                                                          
2 Similar results for employment are reported by Dube, Lester, and Reich (2010: Table 2) using the 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. 
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For their part, ABC used Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) administrative 
data for 1990-2005 for the restaurant-and-bar sector, and obtained a very similar pattern of results: 
negative and statistically significant coefficient estimates for the log minimum wage in employment 
regressions containing fixed county and time fixed effects that declined sharply in absolute magnitude and 
became statistically insignificant with the incorporation of county-specific trends. As they noted (2012: 
424), “…employment in the restaurant-and-bar sector tends to exhibit a downward trend in states that 
have increased their minimum wages relative to states that have not, biasing the fixed effect … estimates 
… towards finding a negative employment effect of minimum wages.”3 Returning to the point made 
earlier about reliance on individual sectors, we note that the same authors had earlier estimated minimum 
wage impacts in other low-wage sectors in the retail sector using data at the county level, again reporting 
little evidence of disemployment effects (Addison, Blackburn, and Cotti, 2009). 
Results for the border-county approach were presented in the study by Dube, Lester, and Reich 
(2010). Using the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW), the authors consider all 
adjacent counties straddling state borders for which data are available between 1990 and 2006. Of these 
504 counties, some 337 in 288 pairs recorded some difference in minimum wages. As noted earlier, the 
impact of minimum wages is obtained from differences in employment changes in these paired counties 
using unique dummy variables for each pair interacted with time period. No evidence of employment 
losses – up to four years after a minimum wage increase – is reported for the two sectors (restaurants and 
retail) examined in the study.
4
  
Empirical Specifications  
All of these models entail alternative approaches to handling trends in the error term that may be 
correlated with the minimum wage. Models specified at a county level that allow for spatial heterogeneity 
in the determination of an outcome variable (E) can be written as:  
                                                          
3 ABC also reported a similar pattern when state-level trends were substituted for county-level trends. 
4
 A similar finding for teenagers using the Quarterly Workforce Indicators dataset is reported in Dube, 
Lester, and Reich (2012). 
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 istisist2st1ist )t(X)MWlog()Elog(   ,     (1) 
for the observation from county i in state s in period t. Here, MW represents the prevailing minimum-
wage, and X is a vector of other independent variables. In this general model, )t(is reflects the 
unrestricted evolution of the county-specific effect over time – unidentified without some additional 
restrictions. The standard panel-data approach assumes: 
 tiis )t(   , 
so that county-specific effects are assumed to change by the same amount (that is, follow the same trend) 
over time. The inclusion of state-specific trends generalizes this assumption to: 
 t)t( itiis   ,        (2) 
allowing each county to follow its own employment trend over time, with the restriction that trend be 
linear.  
 The division-specific effects model of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) would assume: 
 dttiis )t(   ,        (3) 
where  is an effect common to all counties in all states in division d.5 This relaxes the linear assumption 
of  equation (2) – these trends can evolve quite non-parametrically over time – but with the unattractive 
assumption that the evolution of the trend is common to a large geographic area (a Census division). 
 The border-county approach instead assumes: 
 pttiis )t(   ,        (4) 
where   is a “pair effect” (specific to period t) shared by a pair of counties in different states but with a 
border in common. (This entails restricting the sample to counties on a border with another state.)   
Compared with (3), this would seem to make the geographic area sharing a common trend more focused 
(the two counties in a border pair).  However, in practice the application of the model is not quite so 
                                                          
5
 In fact, Allegretto, Dube and Reich estimate their models at the state level. In some specifications they 
combine (2) and (3), with state-specific rather than county-specific trends. 
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clean.  Suppose county i in state s shares a border with county j in state q.  In any given period, they are 
assumed to share the effect pt . But any given border county is likely to share a border with more than 
one other county in the adjacent state. If county i in state s also borders county j+1 in state q, then 
logically that county should also have the same effect pt :  if it was the appropriate determinant of istE  
in the first border match, it should also be the determinant of istE  in the second border match. Given the 
non-synchronization of county lines across state borders, this reasoning would lead to an implicit 
restriction that all counties along the border for states s and q have the same border-specific effect. 
Indeed, for some state-border matches this common effect would also extend to the border with another 
state (as a “corner county” generally borders more than one state).   
 In practice, Dube, Lester, and Reich (2012) do not impose this restriction (of identical pair effects 
across a given border). Rather, a separate pt  is estimated for each border-county match.
6
 At one level, 
this could be interpreted as an inefficient method of estimating the more logically-consistent model 
discussed in the previous paragraph. Alternatively, if the values of pt  really do differ along a border, at 
least one of the times that border county i in state s enters the dataset it would seem to do so without the 
proper control for the county-specific trend. Indeed, in this situation it seems clear that the error 
specification in equation (4) cannot be correct. In consequence, one must either be happy with the 
assumption, in theory, of a model that likely has shared trends at a highly aggregated level, or with an 
estimation procedure in which county-level observations are often entered without consistent controls for 
geographic trends. 
 A final approach that has been taken in recent work is the application of synthetic controls to 
handle the issue of geographically-disparate trends.  As stated in Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 
(2010), this model assumes: 
 titis )t(   .        (5) 
                                                          
6
 This requires the same county being entered into the estimation sample multiple times, with a different 
border-pair effect estimated each time. 
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This allows the county-specific effect to vary over time in a potentially non-linear way, but the change is 
proportionally the same across all cross-sectional units. While we discuss this approach later, here we 
merely note that this is neither a generalization nor a special case of the prior models that have allowed 
for geographic-specific trends.    
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III. The Critique of Using Geographic-Specific Linear Trends  
The most extensive critique of the extension/application of the state panel approach is by Neumark, Salas, 
and Wascher [NSW] (2013, 2014). A major part of their criticism has to do with the choice of sample 
period, raised by other findings from this new phase of research in which significantly negative minimum 
wage effects do not always vanish with the incorporation of state-specific trends (see Neumark and 
Wascher, 2011). In particular, NSW criticize the analysis of Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011) noting 
that there were recessions at the start (1990-91) and end of their sample period. If recessions do not have 
an aggregate influence that is common across periods, the longer-term estimated trend could be biased. 
Specifically NSW (2014: 616) observe: “This, in turn, could lead to misclassification of periods in which 
teen employment was high or low relative to the predicted values net of the minimum wage and hence 
influence the estimated minimum wage effect for reasons having nothing to do with the longer-run trends 
for which the specification is trying to control.”  By way of illustration, NSW (2013) present results for 
California for a model with state-specific trends. The model is estimated initially for the period 1994-
2007, thereby excluding the 1990-1991 and 2007-2009 recessions. They plot the actual residuals for this 
period and then the prediction errors for the two recessionary intervals. It is found that (teenager) 
employment was much higher than would have been predicted by the model for the first recession but 
considerably smaller for the second. When the recessionary intervals are included both separately and 
jointly the estimates of state-specific trends over the non-recessionary period are strongly influenced by 
their inclusion. 
 Given this potential for bias, NSW recommend the use of higher-order trends in panel data 
models.  Alternatively, they also suggest the exclusion of sub-periods of steep recessions in estimating 
state-level trends while retaining the whole sample to estimate minimum wage effects, or the use of a 
Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend the data. They then follow their own advice in estimating a model of 
teen employment, 1990-2011(Q2), using CPS data, first with a simple state-specific linear trend and then 
with a variety of higher-order trends and alternative detrending methods. Apart from the linear trend 
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specifications, they report near universally negative and significant effects of minimum wages on teen 
employment. 
 As a practical matter, NSW reserve much of their critique for the border-county approach. We do 
not feel this is the place to dwell on these comments, other than in the related context of NSW’s criticism 
of the use of Census division/time period interactions in Allegretto, Dube, and Reich (2011). The 
justification for this latter control, it will be recalled, is again one of spatial heterogeneity: employment 
rates for low-wage groups vary by Census division and states within Census divisions serve as better 
controls for states raising their minimum wages than states in other Census divisions. Concerns about the 
reduction in identifying variation for estimation, given that states within divisions may not actually be 
particularly suitable controls, led NSW to consider the use of a synthetic control approach to pick 
candidate control states. When analyzing impacts of minimum wages on teen employment, NSW argue 
that synthetic control matching indicates that states outside the Census division actually tend to be better 
controls for treatment observations, prompting the response from Allegretto, Dube, Reich, and Zipperer 
(2013) that within-division states are in fact more likely to be chosen by their synthetic control analysis. 
Much of this disagreement surrounds the appropriate choice of minimum-wage-increase events on which 
to focus the synthetic control approach, the appropriate pre-treatment period to use in these choices, and 
the choice of variables on which to form the matches (for details, see also Dube and Zipperer, 2015). 
While the synthetic-control approach does offer an interesting alternative that allows several case-study 
events to be analyzed, the disagreements between these two counterparts highlights the fact that there are 
still many questions about how it might be correctly applied in this case.
7
 
This brings us to the second major criticism of the use of state-specific trends, linear or otherwise. 
In a recent paper, Meer and West (2015) have argued that it is inherently more likely for the effects of 
minimum wage hikes to be reflected in employment dynamics (viz. employment growth) than in 
                                                          
7
For example, there is still the issue of how to draw clear statistical inferences from estimates using 
synthetic controls.  There is also the assumption – made clear in equation (5) – that all cross-sectional 
units follow the same proportional trend after the treatment. This assumption is at odds with the findings 
of NSW that there may be important geographic differences in nonlinear trends that are correlated with 
minimum-wage changes. 
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employment levels. The theoretical backdrop is a Diamond-type worker search and matching framework 
in which transitions to a new employment steady state may be slow.
8
 The practical implication is that, if 
the true effect of policy is to change the slope for an outcome variable rather than its level, the mechanics 
of the state-specific trend approach can introduce biases in the estimated minimum-wage effects. In 
particular, any post-treatment deviation in employment growth caused by the treatment will attenuate an 
estimated static treatment effect if the specification includes a single trend for the pre- and post-treatment 
periods. 
Meer and West estimate several specifications that allow for lagged effects of minimum wages on 
employment.  These models are estimated using three different state panels of administrative employment 
data: Business Dynamics Statistics (BDS), the QCEW, and the Quarterly Workforce Indicators.  All 
models also include controls for state population, the share of the population aged 15-59 years, and gross 
state product per capita, along with a complete set of Census-region/time-period interactions. Some 
models also allow for state-specific trends in the level of employment. The authors’ preferred 
specification is a so-called break-in-trend model, in which the first difference of employment is regressed 
on the contemporaneous level of the minimum wage (along with changes in the other controls). For this 
specification, they report results that are insensitive to the inclusion of state-specific trends, consistent 
with their argument that state-specific trends in employment-level regressions mask the effects of 
minimum-wage changes. Across all three datasets, the break-in trend model leads to the inference that 
total job growth is strongly reduced by increases in the minimum wage.
9
 This result is frankly surprising. 
The general presumption has been that minimum-wage effects on total employment are so small that there 
                                                          
8 Ironically, the Meer-West model rests on a similar search-theoretic reasoning to that employed by 
protagonists of the argument that minimum wages will not adversely impact employment because of 
improved matching in the labour market, although they themselves accept that negative effects will win 
out because of a differentially reduced rate of job growth. 
9
 Their BDS results suggest that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage nationwide would lead to a 
reduction in the employment growth rate – both currently and in the future, as long as the minimum wage 
was kept at the same real value – by 0.2 percentage points. That amounts to an immediate loss of roughly 
600,000 jobs (at current employment levels), and a similar-sized additional job loss every year in the 
future.  
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is little need to focus on this measure as an outcome variable, hence the focus of minimum wage studies 
on low-wage markets such as those for teens and restaurant workers. 
IV. Response  
ABC (2012) estimated employment and earnings equations for the restaurant-and-bar sector using the 
QCEW for the period 1990-2005.
10
 The sample comprised a balanced panel of 1,825 counties, providing 
some 116,800 quarterly observations. In what follows, that sample is preserved for the first set of 
estimations.  We also report estimates extending the sample through 2014.  We continue to use a balanced 
sample for the later period, so the number of counties falls to 1,552, although the number of total 
observations increases to 155,200.   
 Our preferred model reflects the addition of restriction (2) to the baseline equation (1) and for 
county i in state s in quarter t, and can be written: 
 itsitiist2st1ist tX)MWlog()Elog(   .   (6) 
Assuming geographic-specific trends are absent (or irrelevant) yields the canonical model (with )0i  .   
NSW find that results are sensitive to the use of population weights in estimation (ABC report a 
similar finding in specifications without county-specific trends). They find the strongest evidence of 
disemployment effects when weights are used, and so we continue this practice in our re-estimation.  We 
have also estimated our models with average weekly earnings in the restaurant-and-bar sector as the 
dependent variable; if the identification in the model is defensible, then we would expect to see 
statistically-significant positive effects on weekly earnings.
11
 In fact, in all of our estimations we do find 
evidence of a positive weekly-earnings impact (see Appendix Tables A through C), and therefore do not 
dwell on these results in the following discussion. 
                                                          
10
 We refer readers to the earlier study for details on variable definitions from the QCEW and other data 
sources. 
11
 Admittedly, this expectation assumes that weekly hours are not reduced by a larger magnitude than 
hourly earnings are increased, but previous analysis of hours effects does not suggest evidence of such 
large effects (see Belman and Wolfson, 2014). 
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 Employment results for the canonical and county-specific linear trends models are provided in the 
first and second columns of Table 1.
12
 The canonical model provides a statistically-significant and 
negative minimum-wage coefficient estimate in the employment equation. Familiarly, after relaxing the 
constraint on county-specific trends, the coefficient for the minimum wage – although still negative – is 
now very small and statistically insignificant. Of course, the main purpose of Table 1 is to examine the 
effect of introducing the same polynomial detrending alternatives as advocated by NSW (and hopefully 
sidestepping criticism of a specification search by committing to a pre-specified research design 
suggested by them). Specifically, second-, third-, fourth-, and fifth-order polynomials are considered in 
the remaining four columns of the table. The use of higher-order trends in two instances serves to render 
the small estimated minimum wage effect statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient estimates 
for the other regressors are little changed by polynomial detrending with the exception of findings for the 
unemployment rate variable in the last two columns of the table (the signs of which are now perverse). 
Overall, however, the results of this first exercise are decidedly mixed and the suggested minimum wage 
elasticities quite modest.  
(Table 1 near here) 
Table 2 takes up NSW’s other suggestions. The first column of the table provides summary 
results for the minimum wage when the county-specific trend is estimated using only the data for an 
interval that nets out the recession years at the beginning of the sample period, and then uses these trend 
estimates to detrend the data for the full sample period.
13
 Use of this revised single trend estimate is 
inconsequential in our case: the coefficient estimate changes from negative and insignificant to positive 
and insignificant. The next column of Table 2 is based on a county-specific trend calculation using data 
between two business cycle peaks (as in NSW, from 1990:3 to 2001:1); these estimates also yield a small 
positive and statistically insignificant minimum-wage coefficient. Passing each data series by county 
                                                          
12
 These results differ very slightly from those reported in ABC, as we now follow the recent literature in 
excluding the enrolment rate as a control, the inclusion of which has been criticized on the grounds that it 
may itself be a function of the minimum wage.   
13
We also follow NSW in using a block bootstrap at the state level for calculating standard errors for the 
non-standard detrending approaches in Table 2. 
13 
 
through a Hodrick-Prescott filter does yield a marginally significant negative coefficient estimate for the 
minimum wage regressor, but the estimated effect remains small (an elasticity of -0.04).
14
 Once again, 
however, the earnings counterpart of the lower panel of Table 2 evinces well-determined coefficient 
estimates for each of the three alternative detrending methods (see Appendix Table A).       
(Table 2 near here) 
In the above exercises we use the same interval (1990-2005) as in ABC so as to determine the 
sensitivity of the (minimum wage) results reported there to alternative representations of county-specific 
trends suggested by NSW. Next, we extend the QCEW sample period as far as we can – namely up to 
2014 –  recalling that the period examined by NSW is very similar (1990-2011Q2) albeit for a different 
sample and dataset (they use teens from the CPS). Table 3 replicates the procedures earlier employed in 
Tables 1 and 2 using this longer sample. What difference does allowing for a longer sample period make?  
Perhaps the first observation to be made is that the canonical two-way fixed effects model (with county 
and time effects) now provides no evidence of minimum wages impacting employment. Ironically, 
allowing for county-specific linear trends now leads to a small negative but marginally statistically-
significant coefficient estimate. However, use of higher-order county-specific trends fails to yield a single 
significant minimum wage elasticity. All such coefficients are now less negative than for the linear trend 
specification, and vis-à-vis their counterparts in Table 1. It is worth noting that this failure to support 
minimum-wage effects is not due to an increased imprecision of the estimates induced by the additional 
trend controls, as the standard errors are actually smaller with the higher-order trend polynomials in three 
out of four cases. Turning to the lower panel of the table, we see that neither method that uses subperiods 
of the 1990-2014 period to estimate the county-specific linear trend yields statistically significant results, 
while deployment of the Hodrick-Prescott filter no longer produces a marginally significant coefficient 
for the minimum wage.   
                                                          
14
 We are personally less convinced by results using the H-P filter compared with the other detrending 
methods. This is partly due to a general lack of experience in its use in labor economics research (also 
noted by Allegretto et al., 2013).  We also note that the filter has been criticized as overly mechanical by 
those more experienced with its use, with the filter tending to find cycles in data even when such cycles 
are not present (see, for example, Cogley and Nason, 1995).  
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(Table 3 near here) 
We next consider the criticism by Meer and West (2015) of the inclusion of geographic-specific 
trends, namely that they serve to attenuate the measured effect of the minimum wage on employment. A 
similar motivation would seem to lie behind Sabia’s (2009: 88) argument that state-specific trends in an 
employment model may “[reduce] potentially important identifying variation.” There are several reasons 
why an empirical researcher might consider omitting a statistically-significant set of geographic-specific 
trends from a model estimating minimum-wage effects. One is that a significant collinearity problem is 
induced.  This concern is not relevant as far as our results are concerned, as consistent estimates of 
standard errors for the minimum-wage elasticities are generally not increased by the inclusion of county-
specific trends. Another concern is Meer and West’s argument that minimum wages may be causing a fall 
in the trend in employment growth in areas raising the minimum wage, so that controlling for these 
underlying trends is inappropriate.  
Our initial expectation is that this latter concern should not be an issue for the elasticity estimates 
from the restaurant-and-bar sector.  For one thing, ABC report that the downward trends in employment 
in states raising their minimum wage are actually lessened after minimum-wage increases, rather than 
becoming more strongly negative as Meer and West’s argument would imply.  For another, we have 
estimated models using data detrended on the basis of trends estimated for a period prior to the 
identifying minimum-wage increases. In particular, we used the peak-to-peak period from 1990:3-2000:1 
to estimate county-specific linear trends, and then adopted these estimated trends to detrend the data from 
2000:2-2014:4. Only the latter data were next used to estimate the employment model. By design, the 
county-specific trends cannot be caused by the subsequent minimum-wage increases. The minimum-wage 
elasticity estimated in this way is reported in Table 3 as the “peak-to-peak, 2000-2015” estimate, with 
positive and statistically-insignificant results that are similar to the “peak-to-peak” results estimated from 
the full data period.   
As noted earlier, Meer and West do find a significantly negative minimum wage impact on job 
growth in models that allow for state-specific trends in the job-growth rate. As Meer and West note, the 
15 
 
specification that they seem to prefer – the break-in-trend model – is somewhat hard to defend, given its 
implication that a single minimum-wage increase will have a permanent effect on job growth. 
Nonetheless, these kinds of specifications – where growth rates are modelled as a function of  levels of 
variables – are not uncommon in economics, and as Meer and West argue may be useful in picking up 
lagged effects in a parsimonious way (relative to the less restrictive dynamic specifications that they also 
explore in their paper).
15 
 As an attempt to explore the importance of Meer and West’s concerns in our 
data, therefore, we estimated similar models with our 1990-2014 data on restaurants and bars from the 
QCEW. We preface our discussion of the results presented in Table 4 by noting that Meer and West did 
use the QCEW in some of their regressions, but their aggregation remained at the state (rather than the 
county) level, while they also chose to look at the broader-based accommodation and food sector rather 
than the more low-wage restaurant-and-bar sub-sector.
16
   
Our own preference for addressing the concerns raised by Meer and West in a parsimonious 
fashion is to consider models that explain long-run changes in employment as a function of similar long-
run changes in the independent variables.  For example, consider a state that raises its minimum wage one 
time in the panel. An empirical model based on 4-year changes would then have that minimum-wage 
change showing up as a potential employment change factor for each of the quarters in the corresponding 
4-year period. With lagged effects we would expect at least some of those quarters in the following 4 
years to have reduced employment, leading to a nonzero coefficient on the minimum-wage change 
variable. Conventional short-run quarterly differenced models would, on the other hand, miss these 
lagged impacts. The estimated equation is a natural extension of equation (6), as differencing over p 
periods provides: 
                                                          
15
 Simple lag structures have been incorporated in several studies in the recent minimum-wage literature 
(e.g. via inclusion of a simple lagged minimum wage as an additional control). Our sense is that these 
embellishments are generally inconsequential as regards the conclusions reached.  
16
 The estimated equation is basically equation (6) with the change in the log employment from the prior 
period (rather than the level of log employment) as the dependent variable, and the change in the X vector 
as the set of controls. As Meer and West argue that minimum wage effects may affect total employment, 
we drop that latter variable as a control (along with the measure of average weekly earnings across all 
sectors). The only other modification is the inclusion of region/quarter fixed effects as additional controls, 
as in the equations estimated by Meer and West. 
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    *istipttpt,isist2pt,isist1pt,isist p)(XX)MWlog()MWlog()Elog()Elog(   
. 
One advantage of the differenced models is that they also difference out any static geographic-specific 
effects, while the inclusion of time-period and geographic dummies is equivalent to controlling for 
geographic-specific linear trends.  
(Table 4 near here) 
ABC estimated such differenced models but only considered one- and four-quarter differences (in 
the latter case requiring any lagged effects to manifest themselves within a year).  Here, we consider the 
robustness of this finding to expanding the sample period to 2014, and considering even longer 
differences to allow for more significant lagged effects. The first column of Table 4 presents results for 
the break-in-trend model in which the minimum wage is expressed in levels. In the second column of the 
table all variables are differenced over one quarter and the model again estimated for the entire sample 
period.
17
 Next, as the longest difference we consider is 6 years, we maintain a consistent sample across 
the four additional specifications given in the remaining columns of the table by starting our estimation 
with observations beginning in 1996 rather than 1990. That is, the last four columns of Table 4 report 
estimates from fully-differenced equations with differences measured over 1, 4, 16, and 24 quarters. As is 
evident in all of these cases, the estimated minimum-wage elasticities are small and statistically 
insignificant. The bottom line in our focus of study, then, is that possible minimum-wage effects of 
employment growth in the restaurant-and-bar sector do not seem to be of concern.  
Finally, we note that Dube (2013) has also directly questioned results from Meer and West’s 
break-in-trend equation. Using the BDS and QCEW, he broadly replicates the Meer-West result on 
aggregate, although upon disaggregation with the QCEW no effect is found for the accommodation-and-
food-services sector. This would seem to be at odds with the results of Meer and West (2013), who in 
                                                          
17
 Both the level and first difference of the log minimum wage can be included in the same job-growth 
model estimation. When we do so, both are statistically insignificant. On the other hand, if we include 
both in an earnings-change equation, only the coefficient for the change in the minimum-wage is found to 
be statistically significant. The latter result does suggest the first-difference specification is more relevant 
than the break-in-trend specification. 
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earlier reporting negative and statistically significant effects for that sector pointed to differences in time 
periods and (business cycle) controls as likely being the culprit.
18
   
V. Conclusions 
The debate on the impact of minimum wages is ongoing. An important recent focus has centred on the 
proper manner in which to incorporate trends in employment outcomes that may differ across geographic 
areas where minimum wages follow different paths over time. Attempts to address these concerns have 
led to several approaches that allow employment to evolve independently (to some degree) across 
regions/divisions, border-county pairs, or states not among those selected as a synthetic control for a 
particular treated state. All these approaches require some assumptions, however, about a lack of 
independence in trends within some subset of geographic areas.  A primary alternative approach has been 
to model economic outcomes in way that allows them to trend in a completely independent fashion across 
geographic areas, although with a parametric assumption (linear) about the nature of these geographic-
specific trends.  In this paper, we continue to follow this independent-trends approach, though by relaxing 
many of the assumptions that underlie the strict parametric nature of estimated trends in the earliest 
research that used this approach.  We also evaluate the criticisms of Meer and West – to the effect that the 
research focus should shift to employment growth in estimating minimum-wage outcomes – using our 
restaurant-and-bar sector data. 
Criticism in the minimum-wage literature can of course be constructive. A pertinent example is 
the suggestion that an environment of deep recession might well produce clearer evidence of 
disemployment that has been reported in much of the modern minimum wage literature. Addison, 
Blackburn, and Cotti (2013) focused on two high-risk groups over the years 2005-2010, and while the 
evidence for a general disemployment effect was not uniform their estimates did suggest the presence of 
negative minimum wage effects for teens in states hardest hit by the recession.  
                                                          
18
 On the other hand, our failure to find effects in the more targeted restaurant-and-bar sector – using 
quarterly data with a local-economy control (like Meer and West) –  raises doubts similar to those of 
Dube regarding the relevance of the break-in-trend model. 
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In the present treatment, we have evaluated the sensitivity of results from restaurants and bars to 
the generalizations of the parametric modelling of county-specific trends, and our results do not serve to 
dislodge the persistent finding of considerably low (and possibly zero) minimum-wage elasticities in that 
sector. We also fail to find any suggestion that the use of data detrended at the county level leads to 
inconsistent estimation of minimum-wage effects in the restaurant-and-bar sector because of concerns 
pointed to by Meer and West (2015). Indeed, estimation of the minimum-wage effect over the longest 
period we now have available with the QCEW (from 1990 to 2014) leads to insignificant effects even 
ignoring possible geographic-specific trends. As NSW would perhaps have us do, we can both leave the 
baby in the bathwater and yet admit an absence of disemployment effects in the lowest-wage sector.  
While employment effects of minimum wages tend to garner the lion’s share of the focus in this 
literature, it may be better that increased attention be paid to concerns having to do with the effects of 
minimum wages on other outcomes: hours, non-wage benefits, training, as well as other margins of 
adjustment (prices, profits, turnover, and performance standards) as suggested by Hirsch, Kaufman, and 
Zelenska (2015). And although we did not on this occasion find any great support for the argument that 
geographic-specific time trends serve to attenuate the measured effects on employment levels, the notion 
that minimum wages might have an effect on employment dynamics (including firm births) merits further 
exploration, building on the work of Portugal and Cardoso (2006). 
  
19 
 
References 
 
Abadie, Alberto, Alexis Diamond, and Jens Hainmueller. 2010. “Synthetic Control Methods for 
Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California’s Tobacco Control Program.” Journal of 
the American Statistical Association 105(490): 493-505.  
Addison, John T., McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti. 2009. “Do Minimum Wages Raise 
Employment? Evidence from the U.S. Retail-Trade Sector.” Labour Economics 16(4): 397-408. 
 
Addison, John T., McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti. 2012.” The Effect of Minimum Wages on 
Labour Market Outcomes: County-Level Estimates from the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector.” British Journal 
of Industrial Relations 50(3): 412-435. 
 
Addison, John T., McKinley L. Blackburn, and Chad D. Cotti. 2013. “Minimum Wage Increases in a 
Recessionary Environment.” Labour Economics 23: 30-39. 
 
Allegretto, Sylvia A., Arindrajit Dube, and Michael Reich. 2011. “Do Minimum Wages Really Reduce 
Teen Employment? Accounting for Heterogeneity and Selectivity in State Panel Data.” Industrial 
Relations 50(2): 205-240. 
 
Allegretto, Sylvia A., Arindrajit Dube, Michael Reich, and Ben Zipperer. 2013. “Credible Research 
Designs for Minimum Wage Studies.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 7638. Bonn: Institute for the Study of 
Labor, September. 
 
Belman, Dale and Paul Wolfson. 2014. What Does the Minimum Wage Do? Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.  
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. 
 
Cogley, Timothy and James M. Nason. 1995. "Effects of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter on Trend and 
Difference Stationary Time Series: Implications for Business Cycle Research." Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control 19(1): 253-278. 
 
Doucouliagos, Hristos and Stanley, T.D. 2009. “Publication Selection Bias in Minimum Wage Research? 
A Meta-Regression Analysis.” British Journal of Industrial Relations 47(2): 406-428. 
 
Dube, Arindrajit. 2013. “Minimum Wages and Aggregate Job Growth: Causal Effect or Statistical 
Artifact? IZA Discussion Paper No. 7674. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.  
 
Dube, Arindrajit, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich.  2010. “Minimum Wage Effects Across State 
Borders: Estimates Using Contiguous Counties.” Review of Economics and Statistics 92(4): 945-964. 
 
Dube, Arindrajit, T. William Lester, and Michael Reich. 2012. “Minimum Wage Shocks, Employment 
Flows, and Labor Market Frictions.” Mimeographed. Berkeley: Institute for Research on Labor and 
Employment.  
 
Dube, Arindrajit and Ben Zipperer. 2015. “Pooled Synthetic Control Estimates for Recurring Treatments: 
An Application to Minimum Wage Case Studies.” IZA Discussion Paper No. 8944. Bonn: Institute for 
the Study of Labor.   
 
20 
 
 
Hirsch, Barry T., Bruce E. Kaufman, and Tetyana Zelenska. 2015. “Minimum Wage Channels of 
Adjustment.” Industrial Relations 54(2): 199-239. 
Meer, Jonathan and Jeremy West. 2013. “Supplemental Appendix for Effects of the Minimum Wage on 
Employment Dynamics.” Available at 
http://web.mit.edu/westj/www/articles/Meer_West_MinimumWage_Appendix_2013.pdf. 
 
Meer, Jonathan and Jeremy West. 2015. “Effects of the Minimum Wage on Employment Dynamics.” 
Unpublished paper, Texas A&M University. (Previous version published as NBER Working Paper 
19262. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 2013). 
 
Neumark, David and William Wascher. 2007. “Minimum Wages and Employment.” Foundations in 
Microeconomics 3(1): 1-182. 
 
Neumark, David and William Wascher. 2008. Minimum Wages. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Neumark, David and William Wascher. 2011. “Does a Higher Minimum Wage Enhance the Effectiveness 
of the Earned Income Tax Credit?” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 64(4): 712-746.  
 
Neumark, David, J.M. Ian Salas, and William Wascher. 2013. “Revisiting the Minimum Wage and 
Employment Debate: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater?” NBER Working Paper No. 18681. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Neumark, David, J.M. Ian Salas, and William Wascher. 2014. “Revisiting the Minimum Wage and 
Employment Debate: Throwing Out the Baby with the Bathwater?” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review) 67(Supplement): 608-648. 
 
Portugal, Pedro and Ana Rute Cardoso. 2006. “Disentangling the Minimum Wage Puzzle: An Analysis of 
Worker Accessions and Separations.” Journal of the European Economic Association 4(5): 988-1013. 
 
Sabia, Joseph J. 2009. “The Effects of Minimum Wage Increases on Retail Employment and Hours: New 
Evidence from Monthly CPS Data.” Journal of Labor Research 30(1):  75-97. 
 
Sabia, Joseph J., Richard V. Burkhauser, and Benjamin Hansen. 2012. “Are the Effects of Minimum 
Wage Increases Always Small? New Evidence from New York State.” Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review 65(2): 350-376.  
 
  
21 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Employment Equations for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector, 1990-2005, Polynomial Detrending 
 
  Order of Polynomial for County-Specific Trends 
 No Trends 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
-0.101** 
(0.039) 
-0.006 
(0.033) 
-0.051*** 
(0.014) 
-0.041 
(0.027) 
-0.062* 
(0.033) 
-0.046 
(0.033) 
Log(Average 
Wage) 
-0.139*** 
(0.048) 
-0.129*** 
(0.036) 
-0.116*** 
(0.032) 
-0.097** 
(0.038) 
-0.089** 
(0.040) 
-0.079** 
(0.043) 
Log(Total 
Employment) 
0.596*** 
(0.053) 
0.770*** 
(0.061) 
0.776*** 
(0.081) 
0.824*** 
(0.097) 
0.849*** 
(0.109) 
0.869*** 
(0.120) 
Unemployment 
Rate 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.004** 
(0.002) 
Log(Population) 0.327*** 
(0.101) 
0.289*** 
(0.066) 
0.247* 
(0.136) 
0.241* 
(0.133) 
0.226* 
(0.125) 
0.326** 
(0.150) 
Notes:   The dependent variable is the log of employment. The standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the state level.  All regressions included fixed-effects for county and quarter.  Regressions 
are weighted by the average population in the respective county.  The sample size in all regressions is 
116,800, for a balanced panel of 1,825 counties. 
 ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Employment Equations for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector, 1990-2005, Alternative Detrending 
Methods 
 Post-1993 Trends Peak-to-Peak Trends H-P Filter Trends 
Log(Minimum Wage) 0.001 
(0.062) 
0.027 
(0.071) 
-0.042* 
(0.023) 
Notes: See Notes to Table 1.  All equations include the same controls as in Table 1.  Standard errors are 
block bootstrapped by state using 500 replications.  Post-1993 Trends detrends all observations based on 
county-specific trends estimated over the 1994-2005 period.  Peak-to-Peak Trends detrends all data 
based on county-specific trends estimated over 1990-Q3 to 2001-Q1.  H-P Filter Trends are the filtered 
series from a county-specific application of a Hodrick-Prescott filter (smoothing parameter=1600) 
applied individually to each data series. 
 
  
22 
 
 
Table 3 
Employment Equations for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector 1990-2014, Various Detrending 
Methods 
  Order of Polynomial  
 No Trends 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
-0.067 
(0.042) 
-0.043* 
(0.023) 
-0.015 
(0.019) 
-0.018 
(0.016) 
-0.027 
(0.020) 
-0.008 
(0.015) 
  Post-1993 
Trends 
Peak-to-
Peak 
Trends 
H-P Filter 
Trends 
Peak-to-
Peak, 
2000-2015 
 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
 -0.044 
(0.034) 
0.057 
(0.115) 
-0.014 
(0.011) 
0.073 
(0.130) 
 
Notes:  All specifications include the same controls (and approaches to calculating standard errors) as in 
Tables 1 and 2.  The “Peak-to-Peak, 2000-2015” results use the same period to estimate the linear trends 
at the county level as in the “peak-to-peak trends” results, but only uses data after this period to then 
estimate the employment equation using detrended data. The sample size is based on a panel of 1,552 
counties.  Total observations are 155,200 in all equations except the “Peak-to-Peak, 2000-2015” 
estimation, where the total observations are 85,360. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Differenced Employment Equations for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector, 1990/1996-2014  
Time Period 1990-2014 1996-2014 
Difference 
Length 
1 quarter 1 quarter 1 quarter 1 year 4 years 6 years 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.019) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
0.001 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.022) 
-0.007 
(0.031) 
 
Specification of 
MW  
Levels Differenced Differenced Differenced Differenced Differenced 
Notes:  See Notes to Table 1. All specifications include the change in the local unemployment rate and 
log county population as controls, along with region/quarter fixed effects and county fixed effects.  In the 
“levels” equation, the dependent variable is first-differenced but the minimum wage variable is measured 
in levels.  In the differenced equations, all variables are differenced over the same stated period.  Sample 
size is 153,648 in the first two columns, and 117,952 in the other columns. 
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Appendix Table A 
Earnings Elasticities for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector 1990-2005, Various Detrending 
Methods 
  Order of Polynomial  
 No Trends 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
0.199*** 
(0.021) 
0.171*** 
(0.036) 
0.141*** 
(0.023) 
0.093*** 
(0.027) 
0.099*** 
(0.032) 
0.079** 
(0.034) 
  Post-1993 
Trends 
Peak-to-
Peak 
Trends 
H-P Filter 
Trends 
  
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
 0.198*** 
(0.055) 
0.229*** 
(0.053) 
0.096** 
(0.030) 
  
Notes:  The dependent variable in all models is the average weekly earnings of workers in the 
restaurant-and-bar sector.  See Notes to Tables 1 and 2 for other details. 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Table B 
Earnings Elasticities for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector 1990-2014, Various Detrending 
Methods 
  Order of Polynomial  
 No Trends 1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
0.222*** 
(0.022) 
0.171*** 
(0.021) 
0.170*** 
(0.021) 
0.150*** 
(0.013) 
0.152*** 
(0.012) 
0.131** 
(0.016) 
  Post-1993 
Trends 
Peak-to-
Peak 
Trends 
H-P Filter 
Trends 
Peak-to-
Peak, 
2000-
2015 
 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
 0.166*** 
(0.022) 
0.146*** 
(0.052) 
0.125** 
(0.014) 
0.148** 
(0.064) 
 
Notes:  The dependent variable in all models is the average weekly earnings of workers in the 
restaurant-and-bar sector.  See Notes to Table 3 for other details. 
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Appendix Table C 
Differenced Earnings Equations for the Restaurant-and-Bar Sector, 1990/1996-2014  
Time Period 1990-
2014 
1996-2014 
Difference 
Length 
1 
quarter 
1 quarter 1 quarter 1 year 4 years 6 years 
Log(Minimum 
Wage) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.101*** 
(0.026) 
0.108*** 
(0.029) 
0.131*** 
(0.010) 
0.185*** 
(0.019) 
0.203*** 
(0.026) 
 
Specification 
of MW  
Levels Differenced Differenced Differenced Differenced Differenced 
Notes:  The dependent variable is the change in the log of average weekly earnings in the 
restaurant-and-bar sector (differenced at the specified length).  See Notes to Table 4 for other 
details.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
